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In 416, the Sicilian city of Egesta requested Athens’s help. Athens had been looking for an excuse to establish a presence in Sicily. Egesta promised—falsely, as the Athenians would learn too late—that it had the resources to support an Athenian expedition. The city’s assembly convened to debate whether to launch an expedition to Sicily and expand their empire, which most supported. Nicias argued against the expedition, urging Athens to secure her current empire before pursuing a larger one and noting that the Sicilians had historically preferred to ally with Sparta. If Athens failed, their enemies would be emboldened to act against them. Alcibiades countered in favor of launching the expedition, insisting the Athenians had nothing to lose as they were militarily strong and had built their empire by responding enthusiastically to requests for support. In a second speech, Nicias intended to discourage the Athenians by pointing out the tremendous resources, financial and human, that the expedition would require. However, instead of discouraging them, it made them even more eager.
Before the expedition launched, religious statues (hermae) around the city were vandalized, which citizens viewed as a bad omen. Alcibiades was accused but permitted to join the expedition, which launched with much pomp and enthusiasm. However, when he was later recalled to face charges of conspiring with Sparta and committing religious crimes, he escaped to Sparta. When the Spartans questioned his motives, Alcibiades told them that, by harming him, democratic Athens has made itself his enemy. He argued that defecting to Sparta didn’t constitute going against his own city because the Athens that committed this “injustice” against him wasn’t his city. By helping Sparta now, he wished to recover his “true” city, not just to be in the place that called itself Athens.
Thucydides suggests that Alcibiades’s enemies in Athens questioned his loyalty to democracy and accused him out of fear. He digresses to explain Athens’s fear of tyrants via the story of Aristogeiton and Harmodius. During the reign of Athenian tyrant Hippias in the sixth century, the lovers attempted to murder Hippias and his brother Hipparchus but succeeded only in murdering the latter. Hippias became increasingly paranoid and brutal after his brother’s death. Though the assassination was motivated by fear of sexual harassment rather than tyranny, Athenians developed an irrational (according to Thucydides) fear of their democracy being overthrown.
Meanwhile, in Sicily, reports of Athens’s movements reached Syracuse, and a debate about how to receive these reports ensued. Hermocrates compared Athens to Persia when it invaded Greece and noted Athens’s weaknesses, urging the populace to remain calm, confident, and courageous. Athenagoras countered by questioning the veracity of the news. A third speaker (unnamed) essentially synthesized the salient points from both speeches, exhorting the city to remain united: Syracuse should both determine the veracity of the reports and prepare to defend themselves. They requested aid from Sparta, who sent a Spartan general, Gylippus, and ships from Corinth. In Athens, the assembly approved a request for more soldiers and funds. Sparta engaged Argos in fighting, and Athens came to the latter’s defense, officially breaking the treaty.
Spartan general Gylippus arrived in Syracuse to find them on the brink of defeat, but his arrival inspired fresh courage. Nicias sent a letter to Athens, reporting the dire situation facing their forces and requesting that Athens either recall the expedition or send reinforcements. Athens chose the latter and set up a blockade to prevent Sparta from crossing into Sicily. In retaliation, Sparta planned an invasion of Attica. The Syracusans maintained their strategic advantage, and the costs of maintaining their presence compelled Athens to collect taxes.
Meanwhile, as Nicias procrastinated in making strategic decisions, Athens’s circumstances grew increasingly dire. After a significant defeat, Athenian general Demosthenes advocated for returning to Athens before the expedition suffered a disaster, but Nicias insisted on consulting soothsayers, which caused more delays. Another battle led to another defeat, and the demoralized troops wished they’d never undertaken the expedition. Syracuse, meanwhile, saw an opportunity to increase its own fame by annihilating Athens. The ensuing naval battle was fought with desperation by both sides. Syracuse triumphed—and, during a chaotic retreat, the troops were captured. The Syracusans executed Demosthenes and Nicias, and the rest of the military was destroyed, either by death or enslavement.
After Athens’s defeat, their allies, including Chios, began to defect. Woodruff wonders if Thucydides believed that Athens deserved these defections. However, many allies “apparently remained loyal” (184), according to Woodruff, because Athens had liberated them from Persia at the beginning of the fifth century, after the Persian wars. Athenians set up a naval base on Samos, which welcomed Alcibiades back.
Following the failure of the Sicilian expedition, Persia began to provide Sparta’s navy with financial support, hoping to walk a fine line between weakening Athens and not allowing Sparta to become too powerful—and hoping to regain control of the Aegean and Asia Minor. While funding the Spartan military, the Persians were also making overtures to the Athenian conservatives, who had long wanted an excuse to abolish the democracy. An oligarchic coop in 411 resulted in the rule of the Four Hundred. It didn’t last. They squabbled among themselves, all wanting to be top dog. Euboea, an ally that provided essential resources, rebelled the same year. The Four Hundred were deposed and replaced by the Five Thousand, according to Thucydides a blend of forms of government. Thucydides’s notes break off at this point.
Woodruff turns to Xenophon’s Hellenica to complete the post-Sicily picture, bringing readers through the end of the Peloponnesian war. Athens’s defeat was cemented at the Battle of Aegospotami in 405. A great wail is said to have travelled up the path of the long walls when the news reached the Piraeus, because the Athenians feared that Sparta would destroy them as they’d destroyed Melos. However, Sparta didn’t destroy Athens. They tore down the long walls from Athens to the Piraeus and left them with only 12 triremes, ensuring that they couldn’t wage war for a long time to come. Democracy was restored in 403, and the long walls were rebuilt in 393. The city continued to be a center of philosophy and culture, with Plato’s Academy opening in 385, but it never recovered its empire or rebuilt its population. Sparta fared even more poorly, falling out of significance by the end of the 4th century.
Woodruff devotes most of his translation’s final two chapters to the Sicilian Expedition and its aftermath. The arc of high expectations dashed—another familiar recurring cycle in Thucydides’s History—mirrors events at the beginning of the war: Pericles’s relatively optimistic Funeral Oration is set against the devastating plague that followed. Thucydides renders the contrast even more starkly with the Sicilian Expedition, where ineffective leadership and decision-making doomed not only the Athens expedition but its empire too.
In the debate prior to launching the expedition, Nicias’s anxious caution was ignored in favor of Alcibiades’s reckless confidence. Nicias correctly anticipated the pitfalls of launching the expedition, and his worries, like Pericles’s, were proven correct: By attempting to expand its empire, Athens ended up losing its empire. However, Nicias didn’t know how to read his audience, who were attracted to Alcibiades’s confidence and charisma. Nicias’s expectations for what would compel them into his way of thinking had the opposite effect, and he ended up dooming them more thoroughly by convincing them, contrary to his intentions, to allocate even more resources to the campaign to conquer Sicily.
Meanwhile, in Syracuse, the leaders who debated how to respond to news of Athens’s intentions arrived at a consensus via a third speaker, who urged everyone to unite in a single purpose. This purposeful application of debate for the public good was what Athens lacked. Adopting Woodruff’s position that Thucydides shapes speeches to reflect his understanding of what the speakers believed (regardless of what they said), the contrast between the two assemblies highlights the best use of debate against the destructive consequences of debate that focuses on individual grievances and preoccupations.
The shortsightedness that doomed Nicias’s efforts in the assembly continued in Sicily. His commitment to his soldiers and their mission wasn’t in question. He built the confidence of his troops with dedication and concern and fought with vigor himself. However, when events spiraled out of control, and fortune fell on the side of Syracuse in an equally matched battle, Nicias became paralyzed by his fears and uncertainties. Unable to decide, he lost valuable time waiting for the soothsayers rather than assessing the expedition’s immediate needs and acting on them. Ultimately, as Pericles predicted at the beginning of Thucydides’s chronicle, Athens is doomed by its overreach and errors.
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